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Abstract
It was realized early on that topologies can model constructive systems, as
the open sets form a Heyting algebra. After the development of forcing, in
the form of Boolean-valued models, it became clear that, just as over ZF any
Boolean-valued model also satisfies ZF, so do Heyting-valued models satisfy IZF,
which stands for Intuitionistic ZF, the most direct constructive re-working of
the ZF axioms. In this paper, we return to topologies, and introduce a variant
model, along with a correspondingly revised forcing or satisfaction relation. The
purpose is to prove independence results related to weakenings of the Power Set
axiom. The original motivation is the second model of [9], based on R, which
shows that Exponentiation, in the context of CZF minus Subset Collection, does
not suffice to prove that the Dedekind reals form a set. The current semantics
is the generalization of that model from R to an arbitrary topological space. It
is investigated which set-theoretic principles hold in such models in general. In
addition, natural properties of the underlying topological space are shown to
imply the validity of stronger such principles.
Keywords: constructivism, set theory, semantics, topology
AMS classification 03F50, 03E70, 03C90
1. Introduction
Topological interpretations of constructive systems were first studied by
Stone [15] and Tarski [16], who independently provided such for propositional
logic. This was later extended by Mostowski [12] to predicate logic. The first
application of this to any sort of higher-order system was Scott’s interpretation
of analysis [13, 14]. Grayson [6, 7] then generalized the latter to the whole set-
theoretic universe, to provide a model of IZF, Intuitionistic Zermelo-Fraenkel
Set Theory. Although not directly relevant to our concerns, it was soon realized
that topological semantics could be unified with Kripke and Beth models, and
all generalized, via categorical semantics; see [5] and [10] for good introductions.
Here is introduced, not a generalized, but rather an alternative semantics. (In-
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2cidentally, this semantics can also be understood categorically, as determined
by Streicher (unpublished).)
An instance of this semantics was already applied in [9] to the reals R. The
context there was CZF, Constructive ZF, introduced in [1, 2, 3] and exposited in
[4]. CZF is currently the most studied system of constructive set theory, because
of the modesty of its proof-theoretic strength coupled with its implicational
power. For instance, even though CZF does not have the proof-theoretically
very strong Power Set Axiom, its substitute, Aczel’s Subset Collection, suffices
to prove that the Dedekind reals form a set. What was not clear was whether
a further weakening of Power Set from Subset Collection to Exponentiation, or
the existence of function spaces, would also prove the same. In the context of the
other CZF axioms, Subset Collection and Exponentiation are proof-theoretically
equivalent, so proof-theoretic analyses would not be able to answer this question.
In contrast, one of the models of [9] satisfies CZFExp, yet the Dedekind cuts do
not form a set, thereby showing the necessity of Subset Collection, or at least
of something more than Exponentiation.
The essence of the construction there is that, as in a traditional topological
model, the truth value of set membership (σ ∈ τ , where σ and τ are terms) is an
open set of R, but at any moment the terms under consideration can collapse to
ground model terms. (A ground model term is the canonical image of a ground
model set – think of the standard embedding of V into V[G] in classical forcing.)
Such a collapse does not make the variable sets disappear, though. So no set
could be the Dedekind cuts: any such candidate could at any time collapse to
a ground model set, but then it wouldn’t contain the canonical generic because
that’s a variable set, and this generic, over R, is a Dedekind cut. 1
This process of collapsing to a ground model set we call settling down. Our
purpose is to show how this settling semantics works in an arbitrary topological
space, not just R. This extension is not completely straightforward. Certain
uniformities of R allowed for simplifications in the definition of forcing () and
for proofs of stronger set-theoretic axioms, most notably Full Separation and
Exponentiation. In the next section, we prove as much as we can making no
assumptions on the topological space T being worked over; in the following
section, natural and appropriately modest assumptions are made on T so that
Separation and Exponentiation can be proven.
The greatest weakness in what can be proven in the general case is in the
family of Power Set-like axioms. This is no surprise, as the semantics was
developed for a purpose which necessitated the failure of Subset Collection (and
hence of Power Set itself). That Exponentiation ended up holding is thanks to
1For those already familiar with a similar-sounding construction by Joyal, this is exactly
what distinguishes the two. Joyal started with a topological space T , and took the union of T
with a second copy of T , the latter carrying the discrete topology (i.e. every subset is open).
So by Joyal, you could specialize at a point, but then every set is also specialized there. Here,
you can specialize every set you’re looking at at a point, but that won’t make the ambient
variable sets disappear. Alternatively, the whole universe will specialize, but at the same time
be reborn. For an exposition of Joyal’s argument in print, see either [7] or [17] p. 805-807.
3the particularities of R, not to settling semantics. Rather, what does hold in
general is a weakened version of all of these Power Set-like axioms. The reason
that Power Set fails, like the non-existence of the set of Dedekind cuts above,
is that any candidate for the power set of X might collapse to a ground model
set, and so would then no longer contain any variable subset of X . However,
that variable subset might itself collapse, and then would be in the classical
power set of X . So while the subset in question, before the collapse, might not
equal a member of the classical power set, it cannot be different from every such
member. That is the form of Power Set which holds in the settling semantics:
Eventual Power Set: ∀X ∃C (∀Y ∈ C Y ⊆ X)∧ (∀Y ⊆ X ¬∀Z ∈ C Y 6= Z).
Although we will not need them, there are comparable weakenings of Subset
Collection (or Fullness) and Exponentiation:
Eventual Fullness: ∀X,Y ∃C (∀Z ∈ C Z is a total relation from X to Y )
∧ (∀R if R is a total relation from X to Y then ¬∀Z ∈ C Z 6⊆ R).
Eventual Exponentiation: ∀X,Y ∃C ∀F if F is a total function from X to
Y then ¬∀Z ∈ C F 6= Z.
It is easy to see that Power Set implies Fullness, which itself implies Expo-
nentiation. Essentially the same arguments will prove:
Proposition 1.1. Eventual Power Set implies Eventual Fullness, which in turn
implies Eventual Exponentiation.
As already stated, the original motivation of this work was to generalize an
extant construction from one to all topologies. Now that it is done, other uses
can be imagined. The theory identified here is incomparable with CZF, so its
proof-theoretic strength is unclear. If it turns out to be weak, perhaps it could
be combined with CZF to provide a slight strengthening of the latter while
maintaining a similar proof theory. In any case, the model-theoretic construc-
tion might be useful for further independence results, the purpose of the first,
motivating model. A long-term project is some kind of classification of models,
topological or otherwise; having this unconventional example might help find
other yet-to-be-discovered constructions. A question raised by van den Berg is
how the model would have to be expanded in order to get a model of IZF. He
observed that the recursive realizability model based on (definable subsets of)
the natural numbers [8] (also discovered independently by Streicher in unpub-
lished work), which satisfies CZF + Full Separation (and necessarily not Power
Set), is essentially just the collection of subcountable sets from the full recursive
realizability model [11], and hence is naturally extendable to an IZF model. It
is at best unclear how the current model could be so extended. Somewhat spec-
ulatively, applications to computer science are also conceivable, wherever such
modeling might be natural. For instance, constructive logic can naturally be
used to model computation when objects are viewed as having properties only
partially determined at any stage; if in addition parallel computation is part
of the programming paradigm, it could be that a variable is passed to several
parallel sub-computations, which specify the variable more and in incompatible
ways. This is similar to the current construction, where there are two tran-
4sition functions, both leading to the same future but under one function the
variable/generic is fully specified and under the other it’s not.
2. The General Case
First we define the term structure of the topological model with settling,
then truth in the model (the forcing semantics), and then we prove that the
model satisfies some standard set-theoretic axioms.
Definition 2.1. For a topological space T , a term is a set of the form {〈σi, Ji〉 |
i ∈ I} ∪ {〈σh, rh〉 | h ∈ H}, where each σ is (inductively) a term, each J an
open set, each r is a member of T , and H and I index sets.
The first part of each term is as usual. It suffices for the embedding x 7→ xˆ
of the ground model into the topological model:
Definition 2.2. xˆ = {〈yˆ, T 〉 | y ∈ x}. Any term of the form xˆ is called a
ground model term.
For φ a formula in the language of set theory with (set, not term) parameters
x0, x1, ..., xn, then φˆ is the formula in the term language obtained from φ by
replacing each xi with xˆi.
ˇ is the inverse of ,ˆ for both sets/terms and formulas: ˆˇτ = τ , ˇˆx = x, ˆˇφ = φ,
and
ˇˆ
φ = φ.
The second part of the definition of a term plays a role only when we decide
to have the term settle down and stop changing. This settling down in described
as follows.
Definition 2.3. For a term σ and r ∈ T , σr is defined inductively on the terms
as {〈σri , T 〉 | 〈σi, Ji〉 ∈ σ ∧ r ∈ Ji} ∪ {〈σ
r
h, T 〉 | 〈σh, r〉 ∈ σ}.
Note that σr is a ground model term. It bears observation that (σr)s = σr.
Definition 2.4. For φ = φ(σ0, ..., σi) a formula with parameters σ0, ..., σi, φ
r
is φ(σr0 , ..., σ
r
i ).
We define a forcing relation J  φ, with J an open subset of T and φ a
formula.
Definition 2.5. J  φ is defined inductively on φ:
J  σ = τ iff for all 〈σi, Ji〉 ∈ σ J ∩ Ji  σi ∈ τ and vice versa, and for all
r ∈ J σr = τr
J  σ ∈ τ iff for all r ∈ J there is a 〈τi, Ji〉 ∈ τ and Jr ⊆ Ji containing r
such that Jr  σ = τi
J  φ ∧ ψ iff J  φ and J  ψ
J  φ ∨ ψ iff for all r ∈ J there is a Jr ⊆ J containing r such that Jr  φ
or Jr  ψ
5J  φ→ ψ iff for all J ′ ⊆ J if J ′  φ then J ′  ψ, and, for all r ∈ J , there
is a Jr ⊆ J containing r such that, for all K ⊆ Jr, if K  φr then K  ψr
J  ∃x φ(x) iff for all r ∈ J there is a Jr ⊆ J containing r and a σ such
that Jr  φ(σ)
J  ∀x φ(x) iff for all σ J  φ(σ), and for all r ∈ J there is a Jr ⊆ J
containing r such that for all σ Jr  φ
r(σ).
(Notice that in the last clause, σ is not interpreted as σr.)
Lemma 2.6.  is sound for constructive logic.
Lemma 2.7. T forces the equality axioms, to wit:
1. ∀x x = x
2. ∀x, y x = y → y = x
3. ∀x, y, z x = y ∧ y = z → x = z
4. ∀x, y, z x = y ∧ x ∈ z → y ∈ z
5. ∀x, y, z x = y ∧ z ∈ x→ z ∈ y.
proof:
1: It is trivial to show via a simultaneous induction that, for all J and
σ, J  σ = σ, and, for all 〈σi, Ji〉 ∈ σ, J ∩ Ji  σi ∈ σ.
2: Trivial because the definition of J  σ =M τ is itself symmetric.
3: For this and the subsequent parts, we need a lemma.
Lemma 2.8. If J ′ ⊆ J  σ = τ then J ′  σ = τ , and similarly for ∈.
proof: By induction on σ and τ . 
Returning to the main lemma, we show that if J  ρ = σ and J  σ = τ
then J  ρ = τ , which suffices. This will be done by induction on terms for all
opens J simultaneously.
For the second clause in J  ρ = τ , let r ∈ J . By the hypotheses, second
clauses, ρr = σr and σr = τr, so ρr = τr.
The first clause of the definition of forcing equality follows by induction on
terms. Starting with 〈ρi, Ji〉 ∈ ρ, we need to show that J ∩ Ji  ρi ∈ τ . We
have J ∩ Ji  ρi ∈ σ. For a fixed, arbitrary r ∈ J ∩ Ji let 〈σj , Jj〉 ∈ σ and
J ′ ⊆ J ∩ Ji be such that r ∈ J ′ ∩ Jj  ρi = σj . By hypothesis, J ∩ Jj  σj ∈ τ .
So let 〈τk, Jk〉 ∈ τ and Jˆ ⊆ J ∩ Jj be such that r ∈ Jˆ ∩ Jk  σj = τk. Let J˜
be J ′ ∩ Jˆ ∩ Jj . Note that J˜ ⊆ J ∩ Ji, and that r ∈ J˜ ∩ Jk. We want to show
that J˜ ∩ Jk  ρi = τk. Observing that J˜ ∩ Jk ⊆ J ′ ∩ Jj , Jˆ ∩ Jk, it follows by
the previous lemma that J˜ ∩ Jk  ρi = σj , σj =M τk, from which the desired
conclusion follows by the induction. So r ∈ J˜ ∩ Jk  ρi ∈ τ. Since r ∈ J ∩ Ji
was arbitrary, J ∩ Ji  ρi ∈ τ.
4: It suffices to show that if J  ρ = σ and J  ρ ∈ τ then J  σ ∈ τ . Let
r ∈ J . By hypothesis, let 〈τi, Ji〉 ∈ τ, Jr ⊆ Ji be such that r ∈ Jr  ρ = τi;
6without loss of generality Jr ⊆ J . By the previous lemma, Jr  ρ = σ, and by
the previous part of the current lemma, Jr  σ = τi. Hence Jr  σ ∈ τ . Since
r ∈ J was arbitrary, we are done.
5: Similar, and left to the reader. 
Lemma 2.9. 1. For all φ ∅  φ.
2. If J ′ ⊆ J  φ then J ′  φ.
3. If Ji  φ for all i then
⋃
i Ji  φ.
4. J  φ iff for all r ∈ J there is a Jr ⊆ J containing r such that Jr  φ.
5. For all φ, J if J  φ then for all r ∈ J there is a neighborhood Jr of r
such that Jr  φ
r.
6. For φ bounded (i.e. ∆0) and having only ground model terms as parame-
ters, T  φ iff φˇ (i.e. V |= φˇ).
proof:
1. Trivial induction. This part is not used later, and is mentioned here only
to flesh out the picture.
2. Again, a trivial induction. The base cases, = and ∈, are proven by
induction on terms, as mentioned just above.
3. By induction. For the case of →, you need to invoke the previous part of
this lemma. All other cases are straightforward.
4. Trivial, using 3.
5. By induction on φ.
=: If r ∈ J  σ = τ then σr = τr. By the proof of the first part of the
equality lemma, T  σr = τr .
∈: If r ∈ J  σ ∈ τ , let τi, Ji, and Jr be as given by the definition of forcing
∈. Inductively, some neighborhood of r (or, by the previous case, T itself) forces
σr = τri . Since 〈τ
r
i , T 〉 ∈ τ
r , T  τri ∈ τ
r, and T  σr ∈ τr .
∨: If r ∈ J  φ ∨ ψ, suppose without loss of generality that r ∈ Jr  φ.
Inductively let Kr be a neighborhood of r forcing φ
r . Then Kr  φ
r ∨ ψr.
∧: If r ∈ J  φ ∧ ψ, let Jr and Kr be neighborhoods of r such that Jr  φ
and Kr  ψ. Then Jr ∩Kr is as desired.
→: If r ∈ J  φ→ ψ, then Jr as given in the definition of forcing→ suffices.
(To verify the second clause in the definition of Jr  φ
r → ψr, use the fact that
(φr)s = φ and (ψr)s = ψ.)
∃: If r ∈ J  ∃x φ(x), let Jr ⊆ J and σ be such that r ∈ Jr  φ(σ). By
induction, let Kr be such that r ∈ Kr  φr(σr). So Kr  ∃x φr(x).
∀: If r ∈ J  ∀x φ(x), then Jr as given by the definition of forcing ∀ suffices.
6. A simple induction. 
At this point, we are ready to show what is in general forced under this
semantics.
7Theorem 2.10. T forces:
Infinity
Pairing
Union
Extensionality
Set Induction
Eventual Power Set
Bounded (∆0) Separation
Collection
Some comments on this choice of axioms are in order. The first five are
unremarkable. The role of Eventual Power Set was discussed in the Introduction.
The restriction of Separation to the ∆0 case should be familiar, as that is also
the case in CZF and KP. By way of compensation, the version of Collection
in CZF is Strong Collection: not only does every total relation with domain
a set have a bounding set (regular Collection), but that bounding set can be
chosen so that it contains only elements related to something in the domain (the
strong version). In the presence of full Separation, these are equivalent, as an
appropriate subset of any bounding set can always be taken. Unfortunately, even
the additional hypotheses provided by Collection are not enough in the current
context to yield even this modest fragment of Separation, as will actually be
shown at the beginning of the next section. In fact, even Replacement fails, as
we will see.
proof:
– Infinity: ωˆ will do. (Recall that the canonical name xˆ of any set x from
the ground model is defined inductively as {〈yˆ, T 〉 | y ∈ x}.)
– Pairing: Given σ and τ , {〈σ, T 〉, 〈τ, T 〉} will do.
– Union: Given σ, the union of the following four terms will do:
– {〈τ, J ∩ Ji〉 | for some σi, 〈τ, J〉 ∈ σi and 〈σi, Ji〉 ∈ σ}
– {〈τ, r〉 | for some σi, 〈τ, r〉 ∈ σi and 〈σi, r〉 ∈ σ}
– {〈τ, r〉 | for some σi and K, 〈τ,K〉 ∈ σi, r ∈ K, and 〈σi, r〉 ∈ σ}
– {〈τ, r〉 | for some σi and K, 〈τ, r〉 ∈ σi, r ∈ K, and 〈σi,K〉 ∈ σ}.
– Extensionality: We need to show that
T  ∀x ∀y [∀z (z ∈ x↔ z ∈ y)→ x = y]. (1)
8It suffices to show that for any terms σ and τ ,
T  ∀z (z ∈ σ ↔ z ∈ τ)→ σ = τ. (2)
(Although that is only the first clause in forcing ∀, it subsumes the second,
because σ and τ could have been chosen as ground model terms in the
first place.) To show that, for the second clause in forcing →, it suffices
to show that
T  ∀z (z ∈ σr ↔ z ∈ τr)→ σr = τr. (3)
But, as before, this is already subsumed by choosing σ and τ to be ground
model terms in the first place. Hence it suffices to check the first clause
in forcing →:
∀J [J  ∀z (z ∈ σ ↔ z ∈ τ)]→ [J  σ = τ ]. (4)
To this end, let 〈σi, Ji〉 be in σ; we need to show that J ∩ Ji  σi ∈ τ . By
the choice of J , J  σi ∈ σ ↔ σi ∈ τ . In particular, J  σi ∈ σ → σi ∈ τ .
By 2.9, part 2), J ∩ Ji  σi ∈ σ → σi ∈ τ . Since J ∩ Ji  σi ∈ σ (proof of
2.7, part 1)), J ∩ Ji  σi ∈ τ . Symmetrically for 〈τi, Ji〉 ∈ τ .
Also, let r ∈ J . If σr 6= τr , let 〈ρ, T 〉 be in their symmetric difference. By
the choice of J , for some neighborhood Jr of r, Jr  ρ ∈ σr ↔ ρ ∈ τr .
This contradicts the choice of ρ. So σr = τr.
– Set Induction (Schema): We need to show that
T  ∀x ((∀y ∈ x φ(y))→ φ(x))→ ∀x φ(x). (5)
The statement in question is an implication. The definition of forcing →
contains two clauses.
The first clause is that, for any open set J and formula φ, if J  ∀x(∀y ∈
x φ(y) → φ(x)) then J  ∀x φ(x). By way of proving that, suppose not.
Let J and φ provide a counter-example. By hypothesis,
∀σ J  ∀y ∈ σ φ(y)→ φ(σ) (6)
and
∀r ∈ J ∃J ′ ∋ r ∀σ′ J ′  ∀y ∈ σ′ φr(y)→ φr(σ′). (7)
Since J 6 ∀xφ(x), either
∃σ J 6 φ(σ) (8)
or
∃r ∈ J ∀J ′ ∋ r ∃σ′ J ′ 6 φr(σ′). (9)
If (9) holds, let r as given by (9), and then let J ′ be as given by (7) for
that r. By (9), ∃σ′ J ′ 6 φr(σ′); let σ be such a σ′ – so J ′ 6 φr(σ) – of
minimal V-rank. By (7), we have J ′  ∀y ∈ σ φr(y) → φr(σ). If we can
9show that J ′  ∀y ∈ σ φr(y), then (by the definition of forcing→) we will
have a contradiction, showing that (9) must fail.
To that end, we must show, unpacking the abbreviation, that J ′  ∀y(y ∈
σ → φr(y)); that is,
∀τ J ′  τ ∈ σ → φr(τ) (10)
and
∀s ∈ J ′ ∃K ∋ s ∀τ K  τ ∈ σs → φr(τ), (11)
the latter because (φr)s = φr.
By way of showing (10), suppose J ′ ⊇ K  τ ∈ σ. Then K can be
covered with open sets Ki such that Ki  τ = σi and Ki ⊆ Ji where
〈σi, Ji〉 ∈ σ. Since σi has strictly lower V-rank than σ, J ′  φr(σi). Hence
Ki  φ
r(τ). Since the Kis cover K (by lemma 2.9, part 3)) K forces the
same. We still have to show that for all s ∈ J ′ there is a K ∋ s such that
for all K ′ ⊆ K if K ′  τs ∈ σs then K ′  φr(τs). In fact, J ′ suffices
for K: if J ′ ⊇ K ′  τs ∈ σs then K ′  φr(τs). Moreover, this is the
same argument as the one just completed, with σs in place of σ. The only
minor observation that bears making is that the V-rank of σs is less than
or equal to that of σ, so again when τ is forced to be a member of σs its
V-rank is strictly less than that of σ, so the choice of σ carries us through.
To show (11), we claim that J ′ suffices for the choice of K: J ′  τ ∈ σs →
φr(τ). Once more, this is just (10), with σs in place of σ.
This completes the proof that (9) must fail. Hence we have that the
negation of (9) must hold, namely
∀r ∈ J ∃J ′ ∋ r ∀σ′ J ′  φr(σ′), (12)
as well as (8). Let σ be of minimal V-rank such that J 6 φ(σ). If we
can show that J  ∀y ∈ σ φ(y), then by (6) we will have a contradiction,
completing the proof of the first clause.
What we need to show are
∀τ J  τ ∈ σ → φ(τ) (13)
and
∀r ∈ J ∃J ′ ∋ r ∀τ J ′  τ ∈ σr → φr(τ). (14)
By way of showing (13), suppose J ⊇ K  τ ∈ σ; we need to show that
K  φ(τ). This is the same argument, based on the minimality of σ, as
in the proof of (10). The other part of showing (13) is
∀r ∈ J ∃J ′ ∋ r ∀K ⊆ J ′ (K  τr ∈ σr ⇒ K  φr(τr)). (15)
Both (14) and (15) are special cases of (12).
This completes the proof of the first clause.
10
The second clause is that for all r ∈ T there is a J ∋ r such that for all
K ⊆ J if K  ∀x ((∀y ∈ x φr(y)) → φr(x)) then K  ∀x φr(x). For
any r, let J be T . Then what remains of the claim has exactly the same
form as the first clause, with K and φr for J and φ respectively. Since
the validity of this first clause was already shown for all choices of J and
φ, we are done.
– Eventual Power Set: We need to show that
T  ∀X ∃C ∀Y (Y ⊆ X → ¬∀Z(Z ∈ C → Y 6= Z)). (16)
(Actually, we must also produce a C that contains only subsets of X .
However, to extract such a sub-collection from any C as above is an in-
stance of Bounded Separation, the proof of which below does not rely on
the current proof. So we will make our lives a little easier and prove the
version of EPS as stated.) Since the sentence forced has no parameters,
the second clause in forcing ∀ is subsumed by the first, so all we must
show is that, for any term σ,
T  ∃C ∀Y (Y ⊆ σ → ¬∀Z(Z ∈ C → Y 6= Z)). (17)
Let τ = {〈xˆ, r〉 | σr = sˆ ∧ x ⊆ s}. This is the desired C. It suffices to
show that
T  ∀Y (Y ⊆ σ → ¬∀Z(Z ∈ τ → Y 6= Z)). (18)
For the first clause in forcing ∀, we need to show that
T  ρ ⊆ σ → ¬∀Z(Z ∈ τ → ρ 6= Z). (19)
To do that, first suppose T ⊇ J  ρ ⊆ σ. (Note that that implies that for
all s ∈ J T  ρs ⊆ σs, so that 〈ρs, s〉 ∈ τ , and T  ρs ∈ τs.) We must
show that
J  ¬∀Z(Z ∈ τ → ρ 6= Z). (20)
It suffices to show that no non-empty subset K of J forces
∀Z(Z ∈ τ → ρ 6= Z) (21)
or
∀Z(Z ∈ τr → ρr 6= Z) (22)
(r ∈ J). For the former, we will show that K must violate the second
clause in forcing ∀. Let s ∈ K. Letting Z be ρs, as just observed, all of T
will force Z ∈ τs but nothing will force ρs 6= Z. Similarly for the latter,
by choosing Z to be ρr. To finish forcing the implication, it suffices to
show that for all r
T  ρr ⊆ σr → ¬∀Z(Z ∈ τr → ρr 6= Z). (23)
Again, it suffices to let Z be ρr.
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For the second clause in forcing ∀, for r ∈ T and ρ a term, it suffices to
show that
T  ρ ⊆ σr → ¬∀Z(Z ∈ τr → ρ 6= Z). (24)
This time letting Z by any ρs suffices.
– Bounded Separation: The important point here is that, for φ bounded
(∆0) with only ground model terms, J  φ iff T  φ iff V |= φˇ (2.9, part
6).
We need to show that
T  ∀X ∃Y ∀Z (Z ∈ Y ↔ Z ∈ X ∧ φ(Z)). (25)
This means, first, that for any σ,
T  ∃Y ∀Z (Z ∈ Y ↔ Z ∈ σ ∧ φ(Z)), (26)
and, second, for any r ∈ T there is a J ∋ r such that, for any σ,
J  ∃Y ∀Z (Z ∈ Y ↔ Z ∈ σ ∧ φr(Z)). (27)
In the second part, choosing J to be T , we have an instance of the first
part, so it suffices to prove the first only.
Let τ be {〈σi, J∩Ji〉 | 〈σi, Ji〉 ∈ σ and J  φ(σi)}∪{〈xˆ, r〉 | 〈xˆ, T 〉 ∈ σr and
T  φr(xˆ)}. We claim that τ suffices: T  ∀Z (Z ∈ τ ↔ Z ∈ σ ∧ φ(Z)).
First, let ρ be a term. We need to show that T  ρ ∈ τ ↔ ρ ∈ σ ∧ φ(ρ).
Unraveling the bi-implication and the definition of forcing an implication,
that becomes J  ρ ∈ τ iff J  ρ ∈ σ ∧ φ(ρ), and J  ρr ∈ τr iff
J  ρr ∈ σr ∧ φr(ρr). The first iff should be clear from the first part of
the definition of τ and the second iff from the second part of the definition,
along with the observation that forcing φr(ρr) is independent of J .
We also need, for each r ∈ T , a J ∋ r such that for all ρ J  ρ ∈ τr ↔
ρ ∈ σr ∧ φr(ρ). Choosing J to be T and unraveling as above (recycling
the variable J) yields J  ρ ∈ τr iff J  ρ ∈ σr ∧ φr(ρ), and J  ρs ∈ τr
iff J  ρs ∈ σr ∧ φr(ρs). These hold because the only things that can be
forced to be in τr or σr are (locally) images of ground model terms, and
the truth of φr evaluated at such a term is independent of J .
– Collection: Since only regular, not strong, Collection is true here, it would
be easiest to his this with a sledgehammer: reflect V to some set M large
enough to contain all the parameters and capture the truth of the assertion
in question; the term consisting of the whole universe according to M will
be more than enough. It is more informative, though, to follow through
the natural construction of a bounding set, so we can highlight in the next
section just what goes wrong with the proof of Strong Collection.
We need
T  ∀x ∈ σ ∃y φ(x, y)→ ∃z ∀x ∈ σ ∃y ∈ z φ(x, y). (28)
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It suffices to show that for any J
(J  ∀x ∈ σ ∃y φ(x, y))→ (J  ∃z ∀x ∈ σ ∃y ∈ z φ(x, y)), (29)
and the same relativized to r. The latter is a special case of the former,
so it suffices to show just the former.
By hypothesis, for each 〈σi, Ji〉 ∈ σ and r ∈ Ji ∩ J there are τir and
Jir ⊆ Ji ∩ J , Jir ∋ r such that Jir  φ(σi, τir). Also, for all r ∈ J there
is a Jr ∋ r such that, for all 〈xˆ, T 〉 ∈ σr, Jr  ∃y φr(xˆ, y). For each
s ∈ Jr, let τrxˆs and K ∋ s be such that K  φr(xˆ, τrxˆs). By 2.9, part 5),
K  φr(xˆ, τsrxˆs).
We claim that
τ = {〈τir, Jir〉 | i ∈ I, r ∈ Ji ∩ J} ∪ {〈τ
s
rxˆs, r〉 | r ∈ J, 〈xˆ, T 〉 ∈ σ
r, s ∈ Jr}
(30)
suffices: J  ∀x ∈ σ ∃y ∈ τ φ(x, y).
Forcing a universal has two parts. The first is that for all ρ,
J  ρ ∈ σ → ∃y ∈ τ φ(ρ, y). (31)
For the second, it suffices to show that for all r ∈ J and terms ρ
Jr  ρ ∈ σ
r → ∃y ∈ τr φr(ρ, y). (32)
For the former, first suppose J ⊇ K  ρ ∈ σ. It should be clear that
the first part of τ covers this case. For the other part of forcing that
implication, for each r ∈ J , it suffices to show that Jr is as desired: for all
K ⊆ Jr, if K  ρ
r ∈ σr then K  ∃y ∈ τr φr(ρr, y). This is subsumed by
the second implication from above, to which we now turn.
To show Jr  ρ ∈ σr → ∃y ∈ τr φr(ρ, y), we need to show first that if
Jr ⊇ K  ρ ∈ σr then K  ∃y ∈ τr φr(ρ, y), and second that for all s ∈ Jr
there is a K ∋ s such that if K ⊃ L  ρs ∈ σr then L  ∃y ∈ τr φr(ρs, y).
By choosing K to be Jr, the second is subsumed by the first. For that, it
should be clear that the second part of τ covers this case. In a bit more
detail, it suffices to work locally. (That is, it suffices to find a neighborhood
of s ∈ K forcing what we want, by lemma 2.9.) Locally, ρ is forced equal
to some xˆ, where 〈xˆ, T 〉 ∈ σr. As already shown, some neighborhood of s
forces φr(xˆ, τsrxˆs), and 〈τ
s
rxˆs, T 〉 ∈ τ
r by the second part of τ .

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3. Exponentiation, Separation, and Replacement
The second model of [9] is the topological semantics of the current paper
applied to R (with the standard topology). There it was shown that the model
satisfies not just the axioms proven here but also Exponentiation and Separa-
tion, and hence, in the presence of Collection, Replacement too. The reason
those extra properties hold in that case is that R is a “nice” space. It is the
purpose of this section to explore just what makes R nice and why such niceness
is necessary for these additional properties.
3.1. Exponentiation
We can identify exactly the property of T that would make Exponentiation
hold.
Theorem 3.1. T  Exponentiation iff T is locally connected.
proof: First we do the right-to-left direction. So suppose T is locally connected.
Given terms σ and χ, let τ be {〈ρ, J〉 | J  ρ is a function from σ to χ} ∪
{〈xˆ, r〉 | x is a function from σˇr to χˇr}. (τ can be arranged to be set-sized by
requiring that ρ be hereditarily empty outside of J .) It suffices to show that
T  ∀z (z ∈ τ ↔ z is a function from σ to χ).
The first clause in forcing ∀ is that, for any term ρ, T  ρ ∈ τ ↔ ρ is a
function from σ to χ. That J  ρ ∈ τ iff J  “ρ is a function from σ to χ” is
immediate from the first part of τ . As for J  ρr ∈ τr iff J  “ρr is a function
from σr to χr”, by 2.9, part 6), both of those statements are independent of J ,
and the iff holds because of the second part of τ .
The crux of the matter is the second clause in forcing ∀: J  ρ ∈ τr iff
J  “ρ is a function from σr to χr”. Why can only ground model functions
be forced (locally) to be functions? For s ∈ J , let Ks ⊆ J be a connected
neighborhood of s. For each 〈σi, T 〉 ∈ σr , pick a 〈χi, T 〉 ∈ χ such that the value
of (i.e. the largest subset of Ks forcing) “ρ(σi) = χi” is non-empty. That set,
along with the value of “ρ(σi) 6= χi”, is a disjoint open cover of Ks. Since Ks
is connected, the latter set is empty. So all of the values of ρ are determined by
Ks, so Ks forces ρ to equal a ground model term. Since J is covered by such
sets, J also forces ρ to be a ground model term.
Now for the converse, suppose T is not locally connected. Assuming that T
still forces Exponentiation, we will come up with a contradiction. Let x ∈ J ⊆ T
be such that no neighborhood of x which is a subset of J is connected. Working
within J as a subspace of T , J is itself not connected, and so can be partitioned
into two clopen subsets, K0 and J0 ∋ x. Inductively, given x ∈ Jn clopen,
partition Jn into clopen Kn+1 and Jn+1 ∋ x. Let O consist of all of the Jis. By
Exponentiation, J is covered by sets I forcing “ZI is the function space from Oˆ
to 2ˆ”. In particular, for each r ∈ J there is an Ir with r ∈ Ir ⊆ I such that,
for each σ, Ir  “σ ∈ ZrI ↔ σ is a function from Oˆ to 2ˆ.” Notice that each Z
r
I
consists only of ground model terms standing for ground model functions, and
each ground model function from O to 2 is forced by J to be such a function
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from Oˆ to 2ˆ, so each ZrI equals Oˆ
2. In short, for each σ, J  σ ∈ Oˆ2 ↔ σ is a
function from Oˆ to 2ˆ.”
Now let f be the term such that Ji  f(Jˆi) = 1 andKi  f(Jˆi) = 0.” J  “f
is a function from Oˆ to 2ˆ,” so J  “f ∈ Oˆ2”. Each point in Jω :=
⋂
i Ji has a
neighborhood, necessarily a subset of Jω, forcing f to be the constant function
1, so Jω is open. As an intersection of closed sets, Jω is also closed, and contains
x to boot. This construction can continue indefinitely: at stage α+ 1, split the
clopen Jα ∋ x into clopen Kα+1 and Jα+1 ∋ x; at stage λ a limit, consider
the function space from {Jα | α < λ} to 2. This is a contradiction, because it
produces class-many subsets of J . 
An example of a non-locally connected space is Cantor space. Forcing with
that produces a random 0-1 sequence, which is a function from N to 2. So the
canonical generic is in a function space, but cannot be captured by any ground
model set.
3.2. Separation
The situation here seems more difficult than for Exponentiation, because
we have not yet been able to find a property on T equivalent to Separation.
Indeed, it is questionable whether there is any such nice property, as discussed
at the end of this sub-section. Nevertheless, we still have a theorem and some
examples.
It is instructive to see why, in the proof of Separation in the main theorem,
Full Separation did not hold, only Bounded. The problem came with the set-
tling. Given σ and 〈xˆ, T 〉 ∈ σr, we need to know whether to put xˆ into the
subset τ of σ defined by φ. We can certainly look for a neighborhood forcing
φr(xˆ) or its negation. But when forcing a universal, we need a fixed neighbor-
hood Jr of r deciding each φ
r(xˆ) simultaneously, and cannot afford to use a
separate Jrxˆ for each different xˆ. Since all the parameters in that formula are
ground model terms, it is not their meanings that could change over different
open sets, but rather only the topology itself and what it makes true and false.
So the natural hypothesis to say that this doesn’t happen is that, locally, all
points look alike.
Definition 3.2. T is locally homogeneous around r, s ∈ T if there are neighbor-
hoods Jr, Js of r and s respectively and a homeomorphism of Jr to Js sending
r to s.
An open set U is homogeneous if it is locally homogeneous around all r, s ∈ U .
T is locally homogeneous if every r ∈ T has a homogeneous neighborhood.
Lemma 3.3. If U is homogeneous, φ contains only ground model terms, and
U ⊇ V  φ (V non-empty), then U  φ.
proof: Let r ∈ V . For s ∈ U , let Vr and Vs be the neighborhoods f the
homeomorphism given by the homogeneity of U . f(σ) can be defined inductively
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on terms σ. (Briefly, hereditarily restrict σ to Vr and apply f to the second parts
of the pairs in the terms.) f(ψ) is then ψ with f applied to the parameters. It
is easy to show inductively on formulas that Vr  ψ iff Vs  f(ψ).
If φ contains only ground model terms, then f(φ) = φ. So U is covered by
open sets that force φ. Hence U  φ. 
Theorem 3.4. If T is locally homogeneous then T  FullSeparation.
proof: As in the proof of Bounded Separation from the previous section, we
have to show that, for any σ, T  ∃Y ∀Z (Z ∈ Y ↔ Z ∈ σ ∧ φ(Z)), only this
time with no restriction on φ. The choice of witness Y is slightly different. For
each r let Kr ∋ r be homogeneous. Let τ be {〈σi, J ∩ Ji〉 | 〈σi, Ji〉 ∈ σ and
J  φ(σi)} ∪ {〈xˆ, r〉 | 〈xˆ, T 〉 ∈ σr and Kr  φr(xˆ)}. The difference from before
is that in the latter part of τ membership is determined by what’s forced by Kr
instead of by T . We claim that τ suffices: T  ∀Z (Z ∈ τ ↔ Z ∈ σ ∧ φ(Z)).
For the first clause in forcing ∀, let ρ be a term. We need to show T  ρ ∈
τ ↔ ρ ∈ σ ∧ φ(ρ). By the first clause in forcing →, we have to show that for all
J J  ρ ∈ τ iff J  ρ ∈ σ ∧ φ(ρ), which should be clear from the first part of τ .
For the second clause in → it suffices to show that for all J ⊆ Kr J  ρr ∈ τr
iff J  ρr ∈ σr ∧ φr(ρr). Regarding forcing membership, all of the terms here
are ground model terms, so membership is absolute (does not depends on the
choice of J). If ρr enters τr because of the first part of τ ’s definition, then
we have σri = ρ
r, r ∈ J  φ(σi), r ∈ Ji, and 〈σi, Ji〉 ∈ σ. By 2.9, part 5),
some neighborhood Jr of r forces φ
r(σri ). By the lemma just above (applied to
Kr ∩ Jr), Kr forces the same. Hence we can restrict our attention to terms ρr
which enter τ because of τ ’s definition’s second part. Again by the preceding
lemma, for J non-empty, J  φr(ρr) iff Kr  φ
r(ρr), which suffices. (For J
empty, J forces everything.)
For the second clause in forcing ∀, it suffices to show that Kr  ρ ∈ τr ↔
ρ ∈ σr ∧φr(ρ). If any J ⊆ Kr forces ρ ∈ τr or ρ ∈ σr, then locally ρ is forced to
be some ground model term, and we’re in the same situation as in the previous
paragraph. 
We would like to see to what degree we can turn the previous theorem into
an iff. Toward that end, suppose T is not locally homogeneous. So we can
choose r ∈ T which has no homogeneous neighborhood. That means every
neighborhood of r contains two points, say s and t, with no local homeomor-
phism sending s to t. If there were local homeomorphisms from r to both s and
t, they could be composed to get one from s to t. So one of s and t can be
chosen to be r.
Example 1: It is possible that there is a fixed s that can be chosen as a
witness to r’s non-homogeneity from every neighborhood of r. In particular,
every open containing r also contains s. If every open set containing s also
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contained r, then the function interchanging r and s and leaving everything
else alone would be a homeomorphism contradicting the assumptions, so some
neighborhood of s does not contain r. The smallest example of such a space is
the two-element space T = {r, s}, with opens T, ∅, and {s}. Let σ be {〈0, r〉};
that is, 0 gets into σ when we settle at r. Let φ be ∀x, y x 6= y ∨ ¬x 6= y.
Suppose Z were {x ∈ σ | φ}:
T  “∀x x ∈ Z ↔ x ∈ σ ∧ φ”. (33)
In particular, settling at r, we get
T  “∀x x ∈ Zr ↔ x = 0 ∧ φr”, (34)
or, more simply,
T  0 ∈ Zr ↔ φ. (35)
As Zr is a ground model term, T decides 0 ∈ Zr. But T does not decide φ: T
does not force “σ 6= 1∨¬σ 6= 1”, but {s} forces φ, both of which can be calculated
by cranking through the definitions. Hence T does not force Separation.
Example 2: An example of the opposite kind is where there is no s in every
open neighborhood of r. Here let T be R≥0. Let σ be {〈0, 0〉}. Let φ be
∀x ⊆ 1 ∃y ((0 ∈ x→ y = 0 ∨ y = 1) ∧ (¬¬y = 0 ∨ ¬¬y = 1→ 0 ∈ x)). (36)
If Separation held, we could form {x ∈ σ | φ}. Settling at 0, we would have
{0 | φ} as a ground model set. But φ is not decided in any neighborhood of 0.
That’s because R>0  φ, since y can be chosen to alternate between 0 and 1 on
the disjoint intervals that constitute the support of x. But on any neighborhood
containing 0, instantiating x with {〈0,R>0〉} forces any such y to be the constant
0 or 1 on the positives, hence not not equal to 0 or not not equal to 1, but does
not force x to be inhabited.
What these examples indicate is less that the failure of homogeneity leads to
the failure of Separation, but rather that what is needed in such a construction
is the transferability of a property of the underlying topology into the internal
language of the set theory. More explicitly, all the proof of Separation needed
was a Kr ∋ r, which may well depend on the choice of φ and σ, such that, for all
〈xˆ, T 〉 ∈ σr, Kr  φ
r(xˆ) or Kr  ¬φ
r(xˆ). It is easy to see that the existence of
r, φ, and σ for which there is no suchKr immediately provides a counter-example
to Separation. This is apparently less than the homeomorphisms needed for local
homogeneity. We find it unlikely that there would be a direct correspondence
between any natural topological property and this feature of the forcing, so
closely tied to set theory and its language. In contrast, there could well be such
a topological property for a certain formula or class of formulas. It would be
interesting to know to what degree this is possible, and why, even when the
answer is simply “not at all.”
3.3. Replacement and Strong Collection
If Separation were to hold (in the presence of the other axioms from above),
then Strong Collection would follow, which itself implies Replacement. Hence a
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powerful way to show that Separation is not forced is to give an example in which
even Replacement fails. In the example below, the offending formula is a Boolean
combination of Σ1 formulas. This is about as strong a result as one could
hope for, as further restrictions on the formula render Replacement provable.
Suppose, for instance, the function were Σ1 definable: ∀x ∈ A ∃!y ∃z φ(x, y, z),
where φ is ∆0. By Collection, there is a bounding sets for triples 〈x, y, z〉 with
φ(x, y, z), as x runs through A. By ∆0 Separation, we can restrict that bounding
set to only triples where the first component is in A and the triple satisfies
φ. Then by ∆0 Separation again, we can project onto the second coordinate.
Perhaps there is still some wiggle room between Σ1 and Boolean combinations
thereof, such as in the number and use of implications (including negations), if
one wanted to fine tune this result, but there’s certainly not a lot.
Example 3: Let Tn (n > 0) be the standard space for collapsing ℵn to be
countable: elements are injections from ℵ0 to ℵn, an open set is given by a
finite partial function of the same type, an element is in that open set if it is
compatible with the partial function. Let T be the disjoint union of the Tns
adjoined with an extra element ∞:
⊎
n Tn ∪ {∞}. A basis for the topology is
given by all the open subsets of each Tn, plus the basic open neighborhoods of
∞, which are all of the form
⊎
n≥N Tn ∪ {∞} for some N .
This T falsifies Replacement. To state the instance claimed to be falsified,
we need several parameters. One is {〈nˆ,∞〉 | n ∈ ω}, which we will call ω−.
Another is the internalization of the function n 7→ ℵn (n ∈ ω), which we will
refer to via the free use of the notation ℵˆn, even when n is just a variable.
Finally, we will implicitly need ωˆ in the assertion “X is countable,” which is the
abbreviation for what you think (i.e. the existence of a bijection with ωˆ). Note
that “X is uncountable” is taken as the negation of “X is countable.”
Definition 3.5. Let φ(x, z) be the conjunction of:
1. z = 0 ∨ z = 1
2. z = 0↔ ℵˆx is uncountable
3. z = 1↔ ¬¬ℵˆx is countable.
Proposition 3.6. T 6 ∀x ∈ ω− ∃!y φ(x, y) → ∃f ∀x ∈ ω−φ(x, f(x)).
proof: First we show that T forces the antecedent ∀x(x ∈ ω− → ∃!y φ(x, y)).
For the first clause in forcing ∀, we need to show that for all σ T  σ ∈
ω− → ∃!y φ(σ, y). The first clause in forcing that implication is vacuous, as no
open set will force σ ∈ ω−. The second clause is vacuous for all choices of r
except ∞, as then (ω−)r is empty. Finally, for r = ∞, it suffices to show that
T  ∃!y [(y = 0 ∨ y = 1) ∧ (y = 0 ↔ ℵˆnˆ is uncountable) ∧ (y = 1 ↔ ¬¬ℵˆnˆ is
countable)]. The term which is 0 on
⊎
0<i<n Tn and 1 on the rest of T suffices.
The second clause in forcing ∀ is similar.
Since T forces the antecedent of the conditional, it suffices to show that T
does not force the consequent: T 6 ∃f ∀x ∈ ω− φ(x, f(x)). If that were not the
case, there would be a term (we will ambiguously refer to as f) and a neighbor-
hood J of ∞ such that J  ∀x ∈ ω− φ(x, f(x)). By lemma 2.9, part 5), there
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would be a K ∋ ∞ such that K  ∀x ∈ ωˆ φ(x, f∞(x)). K, being open, contains
a set of the form
⊎
n≥N Tn. Let M be N + 1. So K  φ(Mˆ , (f
∞(Mˆ)). But
f∞(Mˆ) is a ground model term, and so is (forced by K to be) equal to 0ˆ or 1ˆ.
Hence either K  ℵˆ
Mˆ
is uncountable or K  ¬¬ℵˆ
Mˆ
is countable. But neither
is the case, since K ⊇ TN  ℵˆMˆ is uncountable and K ⊇
⊎
n>N Tn  ℵˆMˆ is
countable. 
Since the preceding is an example where Separation fails, by the results of
the previous sub-section, local homogeneity must fail too. Arguably, though,
that’s not the essence of the construction. In this case, what determined the
choice of y was a different open set for each x. No given neighborhood of ∞
sufficed, because it would have been split for some x into a sub-neighborhood
forcing 0 and another forcing 1. So it seems to be a matter of connectedness.
Theorem 3.7. If T is locally connected then T  Replacement.
proof: Sketch of proof: When showing the existence of a good bounding set (cf.
the proof of Collection in the main theorem), work in a connected neighborhood
Jr of any given point r. For every J  σi ∈ σ ∧ φ(σi, τi), include 〈τi, J ∩ Jr〉 in
the bounding set τ . As for the settling, for any 〈xˆ, T 〉 ∈ σr, by the totality of
φ, Jr is covered by sets K forcing φ(xˆ, τK), for some choice of τK . By settling,
τK can be taken to be ground model terms yˆK . By uniqueness, the yˆKs have to
agree wherever the Ks overlap. Since they’re ground model terms, they don’t
vary, so are the same ground model terms on all Ks that overlap. By the con-
nectedness of Jr, all the yˆKs are equal, say yˆ. Include 〈yˆ, r〉 in τ . 
Analogously with Separation, we do not believe that there is an equivalence
between local connectedness and Replacement. Rather, it’s likely that what’s
at stake is some kind of definitional connectedness, whether an open set can
be split into disjoint clopens that are the truth values of different statements.
It would be nice to see a nice topological equivalent of that property or any
interesting fragment of it.
Finally, it would be of interest to see any examples or theorems along these
lines pertaining to Strong Collection that cannot be reduced to ones about
Replacement or Separation.
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